Abstract-In this work, we analyze some of the existing secret image sharing methods and show that they do not possess semantic security, a property of many secure systems. We propose a new method based on the threshold secret sharing scheme for images in the compressed and uncompressed domains. Our method generates minimal share sizes with similar computational cost to previous methods, yet it is computationally secure and satisfies the semantic security property.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, Shamir developed the first secret sharing method [1] . The basic idea of his (k, n) threshold method is that the secret to be shared is distributed to n participants and any k ≤ n participants together can reconstruct the secret. Any number of participants less than k cannot reconstruct the secret.
Applying Shamir's secret sharing on images provides information theoretically secure image sharing. However, if the size of the shares is important, then this basic scheme may not be ideal. This is because when Shamir's secret sharing method is used, the size of the shares is same as the size of the secret image. Ideally, we prefer the size of the shares to be 1 k of the size of the secret image. Unfortunately, it is well known that we cannot reduce the size of the shares if we wish to have information theoretic security rather than computational security [2] .
Recently, many methods have been proposed to reduce the size of shares in the computationally secure model [3] [4] . Although it is not mentioned in their works, their main idea is to use the Reed-Solomon error correction scheme, which is similar to Shamir's secret sharing scheme. The ReedSolomon correction scheme can be used for information dispersal but not for hiding information as we will show in this paper.
In a computationally secure model, a basic method, for example, is to encrypt the image using a secret key and then apply Shamir's scheme only on the secret encryption key. In this method, every user will get the same copy of the encrypted image and a share of the secret encryption key. Although this method may be more efficient computationally (depending on k, n and the encryption method) than the basic method mentioned earlier, the size of the shares is once again the same as the size of the original image. In [2] , it was proposed to use the above method followed by an information dispersal scheme to reduce the size of the shares. Our proposed method is based on this general approach. In particular, our proposed method mixes a simple stream cipher with the Reed-Solomon correction method to reduce the computational complexity and to reduce the size of the shares to 1 k of that of the original image.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS OF EXISTING SECRET IMAGE SHARING SCHEMES

A. Security Model and Requirements
We use the same security model used for the existing methods described in this paper. However, we impose an extra security requirement (semantic security). In particular, we seek a secret image sharing scheme that satisfies the following two requirements: First, having less than k shares, an attacker is unable to recover the original image. Second, having less than k shares, an attacker does not gain an advantage in recognizing the original image from a group of images that includes the original image.
We show that the second requirement (semantic security) is not satisfied by the following existing methods. All the mathematical operations throughout this paper are in finite fields.
B. Thein and Lin's Method
Thein and Lin [3] proposed a secret image sharing scheme based on the Reed-Solomon correction scheme. In their proposed method, the secret image is first permuted using a key K and then divided into several sections in such a way that each section has k pixels, and each pixel of the image belongs to only one section. Note that the permutation is performed to hide the shapes of objects in the share images. The polynomial of the order (k − 1) is constructed using the k consecutive pixels of the same section, as follows: 
C. Alharthi and Atrey's Method
Alharthi and Atrey [4] proposed an improvement to Thein and Lin's [3] method by removing the need for the initial permutation of the secret image. In this method, the secret image is divided into k sections, and the polynomial is constructed using the pixel values from each of these k sections as follows:
where d j,i is the value of the j th pixel in the i th section. The m th share image is again (m, s m ), where
Note that in this method the coefficients of a polynomial come from different sections while in the Thein and Lin's method they come from a single section.
D. Lin and Tsai's Method
Lin and Tsai [5] proposed a (k, n) secret sharing scheme for compressed images. Using the first coefficient value in the DCT block as a seed, a sequence of random numbers is generated to replace the initial coefficients in the 8 × 8 block. The 2 nd through 10 th coefficients are calculated as C m = R m × C m , respectively, where C m is the new value generated, R m is the random number generated in the range [0, C 1 ], C 1 is the first coefficient value, C m is the original AC coefficient value, and m is 2, 3, . . . , 10. The remaining AC coefficients in the DCT block are discarded. Then the first coefficient C 1 is encrypted using Shamir's secret sharing scheme into n shares and p is taken as the nearest prime number larger than C 1 . Random numbers are generated in the range [0, p] .
In all the above methods, the secret image is recovered using any k share images. This is done by reconstructing the polynomial used for secret sharing (e.g. eq. 1 and eq. 2) using Lagrange interpolation as:
where, l j (x) = i =j
E. Security Issue of Existing Schemes
Let I be an image which we represent as a sequence of numbers, i.e., I = (a 1 , . . . , a r ), where (a 1 , . . . , a r ) are the pixel values of the image I and r is the total number of pixels in I. For simplicity, we assume that k divides r, where k is as defined earlier. For security reasons, in Thein and Lin's [3] method, a random permutation is applied to I. The random permutation is computed using a permutation key K. Thein and Lin [3] proposed keeping the permutation key with the owner or shared among the users. To analyze the security of their method, we consider two cases: i) the attacker has access to the permutation key, and ii) the attacker does not possess the permutation key. In both cases, we show that their method and its variants are insecure.
1) Case 1: The attacker knows the permutation key: In the first case, suppose that the attacker has the following: i) the permutation key K, ii) a single share image (m, s m ), and iii) an image J. Having a single share, the objective of the attacker is to verify whether J is the secret image. Clearly, the secret sharing scheme is not secure if there is a non-negligible probability that an attacker can perform the above verification.
To perform the verification, the attacker can use the following basic steps: 1) Apply the secret sharing method on J. Note that this is possible since the attacker has the permutation key, 2) Compare the generated share image with s m , 3) Return true if there is a match; return false otherwise.
Note that if J is the secret image, the above basic verification method will always return true. The following proposition states that the probability of a false alarm is very small if J is a random image. Note that the same method can be used against Alharthi and Atrey's [4] method; the difference being that the values used to construct the polynomial equation will be the first unused pixels of each of the k sections. Proof sketch: Let s m be the share generated by applying the secret sharing method on J. Since J is a random image with uniform distribution, s m will also be a sequence of i.i.d random numbers (from the finite field) with uniform distribution. Therefore, we have
where s m (i) (s m (i)) denotes the i th number in s m (s m ).
2) Case 2: The attacker does not have the permutation key:
In the second case, we assume that the attacker does not possess the permutation key K. We show that the attacker can still gain information by having only one share. Suppose that the attacker has the first share, i.e. (1, s 1 ) . We have
Therefore, an image J cannot be the secret image if
An attacker can verify whether J is the secret image by using (4), for which the permutation key is not required. In this case, the probability of a false alarm is 1 q if J is a random image.
Proposition 2. Let I be the secret image, (1, s 1 ) be a share generated by Thein and Lin's method, and J be a random image (i.e., J is a sequence of i.i.d random numbers with uniform distribution). Then
Proof sketch: Note that a∈J a is a random finite field number with uniform distribution.
We can extend this attack to Alharthi and Atrey's [4] method. Similarly, we can prove that Lin and Tsai's [5] method is semantically insecure. We know that the adversary has a share image (m, s m ). The adversary selects an image J which is to be verified and obtains its 64 DCT coefficients of an 8 ×8 block. Now the adversary can pick the first value of each block, and use it as a seed to generate a sequence of random numbers. Then it can be compared to the AC values of the share image since these are made public. If the values of the share image do not match the generated value C I of the image J then we know that the image J is not the secret image. Hence, we prove that the above methods that use Reed-Solomon correction schemes are not semantically secure.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We propose a simple and efficient semantically secure (k, n) threshold scheme by mixing a simple stream cipher with the Reed-Solomon correction method. We show the implementation of the proposed scheme for uncompressed and compressed images. The two phases (share generation and secret reconstruction) of our scheme are described as follows.
A. Share Generation Phase 1) Perform encryption on the secret image I using a stream cipher. In the uncompressed domain, the pixel values of the image are added and in the compressed domain the DCT coefficients are added, with pseudorandom numbers generated using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator to obtain the encrypted image E. 2) Using Reed-Solomon error correction, the encrypted image E is partitioned into n fragments E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E n . 3) Using Shamir's secret sharing, we generate n shares of the seed (K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K n ), which are used to generate random numbers for the encryption step.
4) Each share s
Note that the security of the above scheme depends on the security of the pseudo random function used in Step 1.
B. Secret Reconstruction Phase
1) Collect any k shares from the participants.
2) Using the Reed-Solomon correction scheme, reconstruct E from the shares collected, E i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k. 3) Using Shamir's secret sharing scheme, recover the seed value K out of K i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k shares. 4) Decrypt E to recover the secret image I by first generating random numbers using the seed constructed in the previous step, and then subtracting the random numbers from the reconstructed encrypted image E.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Results
We have used the Lena and Baboon (color and grayscale, respectively) images for our experiments. In the case of color images, we considered each R, G, B as a separate gray value and used these values for secret sharing. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the share images generated for the color Table I  SHARE CREATION TIMES FOR UNCOMPRESSED IMAGES   Image Thein and Alharthi and Proposed Lin [3] Atrey [4] method Lena-gray  147ms  94ms  96ms  Baboon-gray  133ms  83ms  90ms  Lena color  177ms  101ms  109ms  Baboon color  158ms  80ms  97ms   Table II  SHARE CREATION TIMES FOR COMPRESSED IMAGES   Image Lin and Tsai [5] Proposed method Lena 94ms 77ms Baboon 110ms 83ms
Lena and gray Baboon images, respectively. We compare the methods for computational speed in both the uncompressed and compressed domains experimentally (by reporting the actual computation times) as well as analytically (based on the number of operations performed in each method and the number of random values used for share creation). The share creation times for various uncompressed and compressed images are shown in Table I and Table II , respectively. These times were recorded using an i5 processor, 2.67GHz Intel machine with 4 GB RAM. The results show that our method is slightly faster than [3] [5] and slightly slower than [4] , as shown in Table I and Table II . Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that our method is perceptually secure, as the share images are noisy and reveal no information about the secret image and there is a reduction in the size of the share image by Our method has slightly more computational overhead than [4] and has comparable computational overhead to [3] and [5] even though our method must perform more addition operations. This is because [3] implements a permutation step which is not performed in our method and the number of multiplication operations to be performed in [5] is much higher when compared to our method, which conforms to the experimental results (Table I and Table II) . Furthermore, in terms of the number of random bits required, Thein and Lin's [3] method needs θ(r log r) random bits to perform the random permutation while our method requires θ(r log q) random bits for the stream cipher, where q is the size of the finite field used. Note that in practice, q is typically less than r.
B. Security Analysis
Suppose that the attacker has access to k − 1 shares, and wishes to know whether a given image J is the secret image. Below, we informally explain why the attacker is computationally unable to do this despite possessing k − 1 shares. We refer the reader to [2] for more details.
We can assume that the attacker possesses E, as this does not put the attacker in a weaker position. Note that having E, one can generate all the shares. Therefore, an attacker who possesses k − 1 shares is not more powerful than one who possesses E. If the generated random numbers were truly random, the attacker could not gain any information by possessing E. In essence, for any image J we have P r(J = I|E) = P r(J = I). Since it is computationally difficult to distinguish between a sequence of numbers generated by the random number generator and a sequence of true random numbers, the attacker is computationally unable to gain any information having only E.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a cryptanalysis of some of the existing secret image sharing methods and showed how to solve the issue by proposing a simple and efficient method. The proposed method, which is semantically secure, reduces the size of shares to an optimal value: 1 k of the size of the original image. We compared the computation costs of our method with the existing ones by quoting the number of finite field operations and execution time. The results show that our method has similar computation costs to the methods studied in this work.
